

The Dynamics of Indonesian Democracy Post-New Order: A Deliberative Democracy Perspective on B.J. Habibie, Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono and Joko Widodo

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ABSTRACT

This study examines the trajectory of Indonesian democracy post-New Order, utilizing Jürgen Habermas's theory of deliberative democracy, specifically focusing on discourse ethics, the political public sphere, and popular discursive sovereignty. Through a literature-based analysis, enriched by empirical case studies and textual analysis, the research delineates the varying democratic experiences under the Habibie, Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono (SBY), and Joko Widodo (Jokowi) administrations. The Habibie era witnessed a democratic resurgence, characterized by increased openness and the integration of public deliberation into policy-making. Conversely, the SBY period revealed democratic stagnation, attributed to high-cost politics, a restricted public sphere, and ineffective institutional oversight. The Jokowi era marked a further regression, evidenced by the suppression of dissent, the consolidation of oligarchic power, and the erosion of meaningful public discourse. These findings suggest a concerning trend towards democratic decline in Indonesia, signaling a potential return to authoritarian governance. This research offers a critical analysis of these trends, providing a framework for understanding the challenges facing Indonesian democracy and informing future policy considerations.

Keywords: Democracy, Administrations, Political Public Sphere

ABSTRAK

Penelitian ini bertujuan untuk menganalisis dinamika demokrasi Indonesia pasca-Orde Baru, menggunakan perspektif demokrasi deliberatif Jürgen Habermas, khususnya pada etika wacana, ruang publik politik, dan kedaulatan diskursif populer. Melalui analisis berbasis literatur, diperkaya dengan studi kasus empiris dan analisis tekstual, penelitian ini menggambarkan pengalaman demokrasi yang bervariasi di bawah pemerintahan Habibie, Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono (SBY), dan Joko Widodo (Jokowi). Era Habibie memperlihatkan kebangkitan demokrasi, ditandai dengan peningkatan keterbukaan dan musyawarah publik ke dalam pembuatan kebijakan. Sebaliknya, periode SBY memperlihatkan stagnasi demokrasi, yang dikaitkan dengan politik berbiaya tinggi, ruang publik yang terbatas, dan pengawasan kelembagaan yang tidak efektif. Era Jokowi menandai kemunduran lebih lanjut, dibuktikan dengan pembatasan perbedaan pendapat, konsolidasi kekuasaan oligarki, dan tidak adanya wacana publik yang bermakna. Temuan ini menunjukkan tren penurunan demokrasi di Indonesia, menandakan potensi kembalinya pemerintahan otoriter. Penelitian ini menawarkan analisis kritis terhadap tren ini, menyediakan kerangka kerja untuk memahami tantangan yang dihadapi demokrasi Indonesia dan memberikan pertimbangan kebijakan di masa depan.

Kata Kunci: Demokrasi, Pemerintahan, Ruang Publik Politis

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INTRODUCTION

The wave of democratization not only hit countries in Western Europe and America, but also in Asia during the 90's which had an impact on Indonesia, as well as other countries (Huntington, 1995; Uhlin, 1997; Markoff, 2002). After the fall of the Suharto administration, Indonesia transitioned from an authoritarian state to a democratic country. This marks a new awakening of the contemporary Indonesian political constellation with the term "post-new order". There was a shift in the nature of power from authoritarianism to democracy that developed six demands of the reform agenda in Indonesian political history.

The reform movement succeeded in producing euphoria of democratic optimism and new demands as a manifestation of sustainable political goals after the fall of Suharto. In this case, Aspinall explains three things that underlie this optimism; (1) Expansion of enthusiasm for the post-new order reform movement; (2) The belief that reform was the savior of Indonesia's corrupt political system during the New Order period and (3) Divisions among political elites (Aspinall, 2004). However, in this phase, democracy is still narrowly interpreted as a procedural electoral arena in the change of leadership and has not yet referred to the democratic value system substantially and holistically. This opportunity gives rise to a new control in the level of political power, in the form of capital-capital power (Hardiman, 2010).

New political forces, driven by capital, shape the circulation of elite interests in electoral democracy. Jurgen Habermas (1991), a key proponent of deliberative democracy, describes this phenomenon as "Refeudalization," where the state and corporations collaborate to undermine democratic principles, reducing citizens to mere political objects while capital becomes a tool for securing electoral victories. As a result, the rational public sphere is sacrificed, transforming into a "mass vote" due to the appropriation of capital by political elites and oligarchs. This phenomenon directly impacts the ethical discourse within society, the political public sphere, and the sovereignty of public discourse—three essential prerequisites for the realization of deliberative democracy (Prasetyo, 2012).

Electoral democracy driven by capital power creates nothing more than a vacuum in the locus of power (Winters, 2011). The solution to this vacuum lies in the true role of the Demos—not merely as constituents, but as active participants in a democratic state (Hardiman, 2013). However, Indonesia's political system in the post-New Order era has never truly aligned with the principles of substantive democracy. In a genuine democracy, the people's will as Demos should be optimized through an ethical process of public discourse, fostering popular discursive sovereignty as the rightful holders of political power. Yet, the reality is quite the opposite. Instead of empowering Demos, Indonesia's electoral

democracy has been dominated and controlled by a political oligarchy since the Habibie administration (Winters, 2011).

The presence of a political oligarchy in Indonesia has been evident since the New Order era under Suharto's authoritarian rule (Markoff, 2002). For 32 years, Suharto stood at the pinnacle of the oligarchic pyramid, controlling both political and economic power. Following his fall, the oligarchic structure evolved into a more elusive and uncontrollable force. This transformation has significantly impacted the quality of democracy, particularly the electoral process. The dominance of capital in politics has facilitated the expansion of economic and political networks, leading to the emergence of political cartels and the widespread practice of money politics in Indonesia (Sunardi, 2020).

Each administration in Indonesia tends to rely on capital power to influence policymaking (Uhlin, 1997). This aligns with Vedi Hadiz's (2005) analysis of the enduring influence of capital in shaping the country's political and democratic landscape after the New Order. The evolution of Indonesian democracy following Suharto's regime can be examined comprehensively over time. However, this study focuses on a more specific scope, analyzing three key administrations in the post-New Order era: B. J. Habibie (1998–1999), Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono (2004–2014), and Joko Widodo (2014–2024).

The transition of power after the New Order—from authoritarianism to democracy—has become a significant topic in discussions on Indonesia's democratic development. A key debate among political experts revolves around the question: What type of democracy is best suited for Indonesia? Some scholars have proposed deliberative democracy as a viable alternative, emphasizing its three main indicators: discourse ethics, the political public sphere, and popular discursive sovereignty (Habermas, 2006). This model was suggested in response to the Indonesian people's aspiration for political freedom, particularly in overcoming the influence of capital-driven power, following 32 years of political repression under Suharto's rule (Robison, 1968; Linz, 2001; Tornquist, 2021).

This article seeks to answer several key questions: How does the dynamic process of deliberative democracy unfold in Indonesia based on its three main indicators? What challenges does Indonesian democracy face in the contemporary era from a deliberative democracy perspective? And to what extent does the implementation of deliberative democracy influence the overall status of democracy in Indonesia? The study aims to analyze Indonesia's democratic development through the lens of deliberative democracy, incorporating various theoretical perspectives, while also assessing the country's democratic status over time.

RESEARCH METHODS

The methods in this study is used literature review to explore the contextualization of deliberative democracy discourse in Indonesia. This approach was chosen by the researcher to analyze and in-depth review of relevant literature, such as books, journals, news, and academic reports. In addition, researchers are also looking for empirical references to strengthen theoretical analyses and relevant case studies. Text analysis was also carried out to identify key indicators of the implementation of deliberative democracy in Indonesia, especially discourse ethics, political public sphere, and popular discursive sovereignty.

The researcher used the original sources of Jurgen Habermas' 1991 and 2006 reference texts to analyze the key indicators of implementing deliberative democracy, as well as additional references through F. B. Hardiman's textbook. In addition, the journals used by researchers are indexed and credible scientific journals. Researchers also present scientific reports to strengthen and support the data so that it is more transparent in terms of processing and displaying the elaboration of the data.

This research is focused only on the administrations of B.J. Habibie, Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono and Joko Widodo. Through the approach to this study, it is hoped that this research will bring a critical discourse, not just theoretical but by looking at existing empirical facts.

RESULT AND DISCUSSION

A. B.J Habibie and the Awakening of Indonesian Democracy

1. The Openness of Political Public Sphere

Huntington's thesis, *The Third Wave of Democratization* (1995), reinforced by Francis Fukuyama's (1992) argument on the "victory of liberal democracy," helped shape the discourse on Indonesian democracy, particularly regarding the expansion of the political public sphere. However, this perspective has been openly criticized by B. Herry Priyono, who offers a radical critique by highlighting the risks of negative freedom, which he argues aligns with the principle of "survival of the fittest" (Herry Priyono, 2019). The manifestation of this unrestricted freedom in opening up the political public sphere has sparked concerns, suggesting the need for a paradigm shift to prevent potential political instability.

Suharto's resignation on May 21, 1998, ended his administration's political instability. B.J. Habibie, his constitutional successor, faced immediate controversy due to his perceived close ties to Suharto. Under pressure from

reformists and the opposition, Barisan Nasional (Barnas), he enacted political reforms, including releasing political prisoners (Singh, 2000).

Under the New Order regime, socio-political discourse was heavily controlled, preventing public expression of dissenting opinions. The 1963 Law on Subversive Acts served as a tool to arrest and silence political opponents. However, Habibie's presidency saw a significant shift, with the release of key political prisoners like Sri Bintang Pamungkas, Muchtar Pakpahan, and Budiman Sudjatmiko, effectively loosening the government's grip on the political public sphere.

Habibie significantly liberalized the political landscape by granting amnesty and abolishing sentences for political prisoners under Suharto regime. This included figures like Cancio AH Guterres, Thomas Augusto, Benedito Amaral, and Xanana Gusmao. Through Presidential Decree No. 85 of 1998, he ordered the release of all political prisoners, encompassing members of the Indonesian Communist Party (PKI) and 69 individuals involved in security disturbances (GPK) in Lampung, Aceh, and East Timor (Dzulfaroh, 2019).

Habibie's political reform agenda significantly targeted the press, a crucial pillar of democracy. The enactment of Law No. 40 of 1999 concerning the Press led to a dramatic expansion of mass media. Print media outlets, which had numbered around 280, surged to approximately 1,389. Similarly, the number of radio stations increased from 996 to 1,070 following the law's implementation (Singh, 2000).

The events described illustrate what Fukuyama terms the "open tap" phenomenon, a sudden release of pent-up political expression following a period of authoritarian rule. While Uhlin (1997) and Winters (2011) share Fukuyama's optimism regarding the global trend of democratic liberalization and its potential for Indonesia, there are concerns about the long-term sustainability of this freedom. Specifically, there's a risk that political power could revert to suppressing liberties, rather than fostering open discourse in the public sphere.

2. Determination of East Timorese Opinions in the Ethical Context of Community Discourse

The post-reform opening of the political sphere necessitated that all political decisions be made and understood through a democratic lens. This shift was characterized by "political reform" aligned with "democratization." A key example of these reforms was the Indonesian government's initiation of open dialogue with East Timorese representatives and the United Nations to determine the future of the former Portuguese colony.

Building upon the need for democratic policy-making following the opening of the political sphere, Arendt (1958) envisioned public space as a vital arena for cultivating individual freedom and equality through state-protected

communicative actions. In the post-New Order era, this individual freedom is considered inherent to every citizen and community. Therefore, any re-imposition of restrictions on these freedoms would not only contradict the spirit of democratization but also stifle the reform momentum within civil society, potentially reversing the progress made in establishing a truly open and equitable public sphere.

In line with its reform agenda, the Indonesian administration facilitated a referendum on August 30, 1998, to determine the future of East Timor. This poll, conducted with transparency and impartiality, allowed East Timorese citizens to express their preferences. According to Kompas data (1998, September 5), approximately 450,000 voters participated, with a decisive 78.5% rejecting autonomy with special status, 19.7% favoring it, and 1.8% casting invalid ballots.

This referendum on East Timor's territorial status became a prime example of ethical-political and moral discourse, as envisioned by Habermas. It represented a rational action by individuals seeking to resolve complex administrative issues. The ethical-political dimension was evident in the collective determination of their fate through a public poll, driven by shared values and ethics. Moreover, the referendum transcended the boundaries of public space as conceptualized by Arendt and Habermas. Each individual's democratic choice reflected careful deliberation, aiming for a consensus solution among the East Timorese people. This process of democratization, in its essence, embraced the complexities of safeguarding rights and freedoms, while simultaneously opening political spaces for self-determination, ultimately enabling the implementation of East Timorese sovereignty (Ariyansyah, Ishaq, & Oemar, 2017).

3. Political Parties and the 1999 Election as a Popular Discursive Sovereign Arena

The 1999 election agenda is inseparable from the demands and pressures of national and pro-reform figures as an embodiment of the fulfillment of political rights and people's sovereignty. In addition to fulfilling the demands of Timor-Leste's discourse of opinion determination, President Habibie, as a prominent actor, plays his role as a "savior" for the newly formed democratic system. Pro-reform figures asked Habibie to hold a general election within six months in order to uphold the demands of the Reform agenda (Kompas 2018, May 25). Reform leaders also consider that the opportunity for political parties must be opened as widely as possible as a consequence of the demands for reform in the political right and political public sphere.

Pro-democracy activists, speaking through the People's Mandate Assembly (MARA), declared that three existing political parties had become

irrelevant and lost public legitimacy. They argued for the creation of a new, alternative force to guide national leadership succession. This public debate culminated in a consensus to form the People's Mandate Party (PAR) (Bintarti, 2018). This consensus represented a demonstration of popular discursive sovereignty.

In post-New Order Indonesian democracy, the concept of popular discursive sovereignty gained prominence, evidenced by active community participation in public deliberation and through political parties. Data from the Ministry of Justice and Human Rights (1999) reveals a significant increase in political pluralism: while 141 parties registered, 48 actively contested seats in the DPR, representing the people's political aspirations. This contrasts sharply with the New Order era, which restricted electoral participation to only three political parties. The existence of new political parties in the 1999 election represented interests among groups. In this case, there is a reactivation of the political public sphere as a medium in the use of public deliberation that creates "public opinion".

While the proliferation of political parties after the New Order suggested a more open political landscape, the parties within parliament have not fully realized the ideal of public deliberation. The parliamentary space, as well as other non-forum political public spheres, often fails to adequately incorporate a truly inclusive deliberative process. In essence, public space within parliament tends to be exclusive and particularistic, excluding the meaningful participation of those from lower socioeconomic backgrounds in public deliberation (Subijanto, 2014).

B. Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono and the Strengthening of Indonesian Democratic Principles

1. Electoral Democracy and Community Political Participation

The democratic period under Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono's leadership in post-New Order Indonesia was defined by direct general elections and active public participation in political discourse. Fukuyama argues that a strong democratic state necessitates civil liberties, periodic elections, and freedom of expression (Fukuyama, 2015). However, Schumpeter's followers prioritize elections as the primary form of public participation, framing votes as "political commodities" within the electoral process (Schumpeter, 2013).

Indonesia's implementation of democratic values can be analyzed through the 2004 and 2009 elections. The primary issues hindering democratic consolidation were national and local leadership and elite competition. The elections following 1999 resulted in damaging power conflicts between the legislative and executive branches, which destabilized the political landscape, even with a strong 92.6% public participation in voting.

High campaign costs in post-New Order Indonesian elections have driven corruption as a means of recouping funds, creating new forms of corruption (Dwipayana, 2009). The 2004 presidential election shows this, with campaign costs ranging from 100 billion rupiah (SBY-JK) to 500 billion rupiah (Hamzah-Agum) (Tempo, 2004, June 20). These figures reflect the high financial demands of the first round of the 2004 presidential elections (June 1-7, 2004).

Candidate President and Vice President	Print	Television	Outdoor	Total
Wiranto-Gus Sholah	10 Million	2.259 billion	1.683 billion	3.952 billion
Mega-Hasyim	113.4 Million	4.116 billion	313.1 Million	4.542 billion
Amien-Siswono	722.7 Million	511.5 Million	331.9 Million	1.556 billion
SBY-Jusuf Kalla	423.9 Million	1.403 billion	1.887 billion	3.715 billion
Hamzah-Agum	305.6 Million	555.5 Million	231.5 Million	1,092 Million

Table 1 Campaign Funds for the First Round of the 2004 Elections, Total Expenditure on Print, Electronic Media, and Outdoor Campaigns (Source: ICW, 2004).

Table 1 shows high the cost of politics in the first period of direct elections. In the 2004 election contest, the election was held in two rounds with each vote in the first round as follows; 1. Wiranto-Gus Sholah: 22.15%; 2. Megawati-Hasyim: 26.61%; 3. Amien-Siswono: 14.66%; 4. SBY-JK: 33.57%; 5. Hamzah-Agum: 3.01%. With this result, the second round was only attended by the Mega-Hasyim and SBY-JK. The second round of the 2004 election produced SBY-JK as president and vice president with 60.62% of the votes, while Mega-Hasyim received 39.38% of the votes. This is a historical momentum for direct elections by the people after Suharto's authoritarianism for 32 years (KPU Team, 2004).

The rise of democratic elitism within the electoral system has led to a breakdown in communication between the public and their representatives. Despite the initial expansion of the political public sphere through democratization, it has subsequently diminished. While citizens are granted the freedom to vote, their right to engage in meaningful public deliberation and hold representatives accountable is being suppressed by the way political parties operate in parliament.

The discourse surrounding electoral democracy often downplays the prevalence of transactional political processes. However, the concept of "reification," which can be seen as a modern form of "refeudalization" as described by Habermas, suggests that individual political relationships are increasingly treated as transactional commodities (Hardiman 2009). This trend indicates that modern democracy, while emphasizing electoral participation, risks reducing political engagement to mere market exchanges, undermining the ideal of reasoned public deliberation.

2. Ethical-Political Discourse: Regulation and Civil Liberties

The SBY era in post-New Order Indonesia saw numerous controversial laws, triggering public debate. Following Habermas, public deliberation is vital when policy limits citizen criticism (Hardiman, 2009). This process reveals the interests behind policy decisions. Examples include the Anti-Pornography and Pornoaction Law (Law No. 44 of 2008), the Information and Electronic Transactions Law (Law No. 11 of 2008, known as ITE Law), the Minerals and Coal Law (Law No. 4 of 2009), and the Law on the Election of Governors, Regents, and Mayors (Law No. 22 of 2014). The ITE Law during the SBY era restricted civil liberties. Al-Faridzi (2020) found 61 cases from 2008-2014, with 33 involving defamation, demonstrating public fear of state repression. The law, originally meant for e-commerce protection, was misused for political purposes.

Mahfud MD (2009) explained that there are at least two differences in the configuration of political products. *First*, the democratic political configuration, which prioritizes public deliberation processes, openness, and accommodating the political aspirations of the community and citizens. *Second*, the authoritarian political configuration, which puts the focus of law-making on the dominance of the power of administration.

This trend, according to Aspinall & Berenschot (2019), points to a stagnation in democratic development, specifically regarding public deliberation and civic engagement. Winter (2011) suggests that instead of democratic consolidation, Indonesia is experiencing the consolidation of oligarchic and elite power. Deliberative democracy, as highlighted by Bohman (2006), is essential for legitimizing collective decisions. However, for it to function effectively, Dahl (2001) stresses the importance of equal rights, ensuring that all members of society view their political standing as equivalent.

C. Joko Widodo and Portrait of the Phenomenon of Indonesian Democracy

1. Political Cartelism and Power Oligarchs

The circulation of capital and interests in the power struggle has been read since the 1999 elections. Competition between parties only exists at the level of political contestation, which then turns into a relational relationship when entering the House of Representatives and the administration. From here, the

meaning of the opposition vacuum against the government becomes very clear, because the government opposition is only limited to democratic cosmetics. In this context, Horowitz (2013) mentioned that there was a process of consolidation of democracy after the transition of the new order government towards reform, which caused all political forces to fuse to provide the meaning of change and political unity. However, one of the weaknesses of this is the absence of clear opposition and political opponents to establish democratic principles, namely Checks and Balances.

The phenomenon during Indonesia's democratic process is culminated in the Jokowi administration (Linz (2001); Robison & Hadiz (2004); Dwipayana (2009); Winters (2011); Horowitz (2013); Power (2018); and Aspinall & Berenschot (2019). There is a shift in the democratic climate that causes the analysis and arguments of experts to be debated in public discourse. According to Bilveer Singh (2000) in the era of democratization transition, the Habibie government succeeded in opening up the political public sphere so that it had a significant impact on the development of democracy in Indonesia. During the SBY period, democracy was stagnant even though the state of government was stable and there was no horizontal conflict with the community or often called "reasonable stable yet low quality" (Tomsa, 2010). Meanwhile, during Jokowi's era, there was a regression of democracy or regression due to several factors, including; the reduction of popular sovereignty, the rise of conservative Islamic forces, the use of coercive instruments, and the weakening of opposition institutions. (Power T. P., 2018)

Political cartelization since Indonesia's democratic transition has reduced public discourse. Capital's influence has co-opted the political sphere, blocking citizen communication (Berlin, 2017). Capital dominates government and parliamentary decisions. Habermas's deliberative democracy, with its emphasis on accountability, offers a solution, demanding political contestants represent citizen aspirations.

The empiricism of political cartelism in the Jokowi era is explained by the Habermasian approach with the term "Refeodalization" or making individuals as political objects. In fact, Isaiah Berlin criticized the conception of refeodalization carried out by the state. The state should provide guarantees as a facilitator who acts when there is fraud in election issues and does not have the right to intervene in politics against its citizens. In contextualization, it is emphasized that in the Jokowi period, there was a large coalition of governments – including the entry of the Gerindra party into the cabinet, the lack of strong opposition in the 2014-2024 period, to the distribution of government political allotments carried out by Jokowi in the 2019-2024 period – with the entry of Prabowo Subianto into the administration cabinet.

2. Public Deliberation in the Vortex of Regulatory Power

Post-New Order Indonesian democracy has faced different challenges under each administration. During the SBY era, it stagnated (Haris, 2019) due to anti-reform elite conflicts (Aspinall, 2010). The Jokowi era has seen a worsening decline, with elite consolidation, eroded citizen rights, non-inclusive policies, and a return to authoritarianism (Power, 2018; Stott, 2019; Power & Warburton, 2020). Based on the reports *The Economist Intelligence Unit* (EIU) (2021), Indonesian democracy experienced a decline in value that touched 6.30. This figure is the smallest in the last 14 years. This democratic regression is also followed by other Southeast Asian countries, such as Thailand and the Philippines. The downward trend of democracy is due to the rise of "political illiberalism" or "democratic illiberalism" in the global and national reach. For example, freedom of opinion continues to be curtailed, the passive involvement of citizens' participation in policy-making, and the return of the function of the state repressive apparatus in taking action in crisis situations.

Empirically, the hijacking of the political rights of the community can be seen from the emergence of several public policies designed by the Jokowi administration without going through public deliberation. It can be seen from the issuance of the revision of Law No. 19 of 2016 concerning Information and Electronic Transactions, Law No. 19 of 2019 concerning the Corruption Eradication Commission (KPK), Law No. 3 of 2020 concerning Mineral and Coal Mining (Minerba), and Law No. 11 of 2020 concerning Job Creation (Omnibus Law Ciptaker). The above regulations are some of the many laws and regulations that undermine Indonesian democracy. The reason for the passage of some of these regulations is the jamming of political communication networks, so that political aspirations fail to be absorbed and used as a consideration for policymaking.

In essence, the democratic promise of post-New Order Indonesia has been undermined by the dominance of elite interests and the transactional nature of political participation. The co-optation of the public sphere by oligarchs and the erosion of genuine representation by political parties have created a system where citizen voices are marginalized. To revitalize Indonesian democracy, it is crucial to dismantle these barriers, fostering transparent, inclusive, and accountable political processes that prioritize public deliberation and genuine representation over elite influence and transactional politics. Only then can the potential of a truly democratic Indonesia be realized.

CONCLUSION

The dynamics that occurred during Habibie's era was marked by the opening of the wide political public sphere in the arena of mass media proliferation, political parties, and the absorption of public deliberation as a consideration for policymaking. During the SBY period, the existing dynamics

brought Indonesian democracy to a phase of stagnation, this can be seen from the phenomenon of high-cost democracy, the half-opening of the political public sphere, and efforts to institutionalize the opposition that were less than optimal. During Jokowi's time, Indonesian democracy was in a regression stage, this was due to the emergence of various phenomena that threatened the political public sphere and public deliberation, such as the use of coercive instruments against the administration opposition, the formation of very strong political cartelism and oligarchy, and the stagnation of public deliberation of the people in the arena of political public sphere.

This research focuses solely on the Habibie, SBY, and Jokowi administrations. This limitation is not for generalization, but to provide a detailed analysis of each era, serving as a reference for future discussions on Indonesian democracy.

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